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Abstract  
Purpose – This paper aims to explore how community-controlled open innovation affects cost- and
 
differentiation-based competitive advantage, and to explain how it allows some sources of economic
 
rent to remain while others are taken away. Although models of competitive-advantage remain
 
relevant, open innovation means that the main drivers of performance are changed. Open innovation
 
means that there are implications for ﬁrms’ ability to proﬁt from intellectual property that they do not
 
own. The paper seeks to address those issues.
 
Design/methodology/approach – The work is conceptual.
 
Findings – Economic rents from property rights disappear, those from economies of scale and capital
 
requirements are reduced, but those from experience-curve effects, differentiation, distribution, and
 
switching costs remain. Similarly, rents from the difﬁcult-to-imitate resources of networks and
 
reputation remain intact, and while those from employee knowhow and culture remain, they are likely
 
to be in reduced amounts.
 
Research limitations/implications – Propositions are provided for empirical testing. There also is
 
a need to identify breakpoints between open-innovation beneﬁts and the costs associated with lost
 
innovation skills, and a need to extend this work to ﬁrm-controlled and third-party controlled open
 
innovation.
 
Practical implications – For some ﬁrms open innovation will not adversely affect competitive
 
advantage but those whose advantage is driven by barriers to entry, skills in innovation and
 
anticipating customer needs, or that rely on proprietary product designs, can lose in the longer term.
 
Originality/value – Where the majority of work examining open innovation addresses property
 
rights, economic rationales, governance, and processes, this work focuses on the effects of open
 
innovation on strategy content and consequent ﬁrm performance.
 
Keywords Open innovation, Competitive advantage, Economic rents, Innovation
 
Paper type Conceptual paper
 
Introduction 
Sawhney and Prandelli (2000) are generally credited with originating the term open 
innovation but, since then, Chesbrough’s (2003a) seminal work moved the concept on to 
include a variety of ways to capitalize on innovations both externally and internally. 
He saw open innovation as a paradigm shift from creating and hoarding innovations 
internally to accessing and integrating external knowledge. The latter is based on one 
of his key principals of “not all the smart people work for us.” That sentiment has been 
taken to heart by Procter and Gamble who now get over half of their innovations from 
outside sources. For example, one of Procter and Gamble’s best selling products, the 
Spinbrush, a battery operated electric toothbrush, was developed by four 
entrepreneurs in Cleveland, Ohio (Chesbrough, 2003b). In addition to ﬁnding 
revenue-generating innovations, open innovation has had the added beneﬁt of 
improving Procter and Gamble’s R&D efﬁciency (RTM, 2007). Chesbrough foresaw 
that open innovation can eliminate innovation costs altogether, but that it constitutes a 
two-edged sword because, by eliminating the cost of innovation, it also removes a 
barrier to new competition. That, plus other concerns have emerged with the increase 
in open innovation; for example, there is the risk of loss of innovation skills, the costs of 
coordination can be high, and being able to generate proﬁts is uncertain (Enkel et al., 
2009). The latter continues to be a topic of signiﬁcant interest in both the business 
press and trade journals (for example, see Collins, 2007; Hamm, 2007; Howe, 2006; 
Lamarca, 2006), but has not received nearly as much academic attention. Consequently, 
in this work we explore how open innovation affects ﬁrms’ abilities to generate and 
capture the economic rents that accompany the competitive advantage that comes from 
controlling the intellectual property that underpins innovations. 
Open-innovation takes three main forms: ﬁrm controlled, third-party controlled, and 
community controlled. For example, for ﬁrm controlled, Siemens has its own web site 
that solicits innovations, as do other companies like the Crown Packing Technology. 
Third-party sites, such as InnoCentive.com, which was developed by Eli Lilly and is 
also now used by ﬁrms like Boeing and Dupont, typically provide a way for ﬁrms to 
post problems so that individuals or organizations can provide a solution and receive a 
monetary reward (Howe, 2006). The ﬁnal category of community-controlled sites 
includes Elphel, Neuros OSD, Open EEG, Openpandora, Oscar, OSGV, and RepRap 
(Abdelkaﬁ et al., 2009; Raasch et al., 2009), among others. Elphel designs 
high-performance cameras, Open EEG designs devices to capture neuron feedback 
from the brain, Openpandora developed a pocket gamer (now in production), Oscar is 
designing a world car with sustainable mobility, OSGV is developing a 
seven-passenger SUV with various fuel options, and RepRap is developing 
self-replicating 3D printers. These communities can be small (seven people started 
Openpandora and 15 people developed the Free Beer community) to very large (an 
estimated 30,000 in Neuros OSD), and the innovations that emerge from them can 
include new technologies, product improvements, or new product designs. Although 
this form of open innovation has received less attention than the other two forms, it is 
important because the control of the intellectual property is outside the boundaries of 
any ﬁrms wanting to use it (see Ulhoi, 2004). This lack of control of intellectual 
property provides a more-stringent test of the models that have served strategic 
management well in the past and, consequently, we focus on this form of open 
innovation in this work. 
Raasch et al.’ (2009) interviews with executives revealed that deriving a proﬁt from 
open and easily imitable designs is counterintuitive. So, in this work, we seek to 
determine how established thinking on business-level strategy and competitive 
advantage is affected by open innovation. Thus, our level of analysis is the ﬁrm and, 
speciﬁcally, strategy and performance at the business level. Although some non-proﬁt 
organizations have been using open innovation, here, we are assuming the existence of 
a proﬁt motive. 
Competitive advantage and economic rents 
Monopoly rents arise from barriers to competition and barriers to entry that prohibit 
potential competitors from satisfying excess demand. The lists of what constitutes 
these barriers are numerous, overlapping, and long established in the literature: Bain 
(1954, 1956) identiﬁed scale and capital requirements as determinants of entry and, in 
his book on Barriers to New Competition, he also emphasized the importance of 
product differentiation and absolute cost advantage. Since then, scholars also have 
focused on experience-curve effects, capital requirements, customer switching-costs, 
access to distribution channels, property rights, and other cost advantages 
independent of scale as being sources of barriers to entry (e.g. Karakaya and Stahl, 
1989; Lieberman, 1987; Porter, 1980). Synthesizing these, we bound our study and focus 
on scale, experience effects, capital requirements, product differentiation, distribution, 
and switching costs. Given the nature of this work, we separate out property rights. 
Ricardian rents arise from owning scarce and valuable resources (see Mahoney and 
Pandian, 1992; Peteraf, 1993). For example, ﬁrms can capitalize on things like a good 
reputation because market failure means that such resources cannot be purchased in 
factor markets by competitors. Similar to the lists for sources of monopoly rents, there 
exist numerous lists of the sources of Ricardian rents. They include resources that are 
valuable, rare, and difﬁcult to imitate; durable resources that are not readily 
transparent, transferable, or replicable by competitors; and resources that are 
heterogenous among ﬁrms and are imperfectly mobile and imperfectly imitable 
(Barney, 1991; Grant, 1991; Peteraf, 1993). However, it was Hall’s (1992, 1993) grounded 
research that identiﬁed the intangible resources of reputation, employee knowhow, 
culture, networks, and databases as being the main sources of sustainable advantage, 
which we focus on here as the key drivers of Ricardian rents. 
A third type of rents associated with innovation, entrepreneurial rents, are naturally 
self-destructive because, with patenting or bringing-to-market a new product or 
service, the underlying knowledge is revealed. Given that open innovation 
automatically diffuses knowledge, entrepreneurial rents will not exist. That does not 
mean that with open-innovation entrepreneurial activity cannot exist. Instead, it 
simply means that open innovation removes the need to reverse-engineer products or 
circumvent patents. Thus, we restrict our discussion to monopoly and Ricardian rents. 
The pairing of those with the fundamental drivers of competitive advantage – cost and 
differentiation – provides an organizing framework for the rest of our discussions on 
open innovation. That framework and the outcomes of the following discussions are 
summarized in Figure 1. 
Cost-based advantage and monopoly rents 
Open innovation allows monopoly rents from economies of scale, experience-curve 
effects, and capital requirements. Marshall (1967) deﬁned economies of scale as “the 
advantages created within the plant or ﬁrm, by reason of the increase in the scale of the 
plant’s production or of the ﬁrm’s operation.” Stated more broadly, cost savings are 
available from efﬁciencies as the ﬁrm increases its size. Even when adopting 
open-innovation designs for new products, Lego still beneﬁts from its scale effects in 
production and distribution, as does Procter and Gamble with the open innovations it 
elects to commercialize. In addition to the obvious scale beneﬁts in operations and 
administration, there are other beneﬁts that accrue to larger ﬁrms. For example, 
research has revealed that ﬁrms with larger numbers of employees are better able to 
capitalize on knowledge and knowledge spillovers (Macher and Boerner, 2006). The 
beneﬁts of specialization and standardization in operations and administration are 
ﬁrm-speciﬁc, as are the beneﬁts of knowledge spillovers. All of these are sources of 
barriers to entry and, therefore, monopoly rents should continue to be available 
regardless of the source of innovation. 
Similarly, we can conceive of no reason why the source of innovation should affect 
monopoly rents from experience-curve effects in things like production. Each time 
Procter and Gamble doubles output of the Swifferq duster (an external innovation) its 
production costs can be reduced by a set amount. Additionally, because 
open-innovation tends to be an internet phenomenon, the associated technology may 
improve the potential for rents from experience curves in other areas. Amit and Zott 
(2001) examined value creation in e-business and developed theory explaining how 
transaction efﬁciencies are available, not only for the customer but also for ﬁrms. They 
identiﬁed beneﬁts from the interconnectivity that are available with virtual markets, 
faster decision making (information is more readily available), streamlined inventory 
control and supply-chain management, reduced marketing and sales costs, and better 
scalability which, by scaling up, allows scale effects from increased numbers of 
customer transactions. Relatedly, the work by Macher and Boerner (2006) revealed 
Figure 1. 
What open innovation 
allows and takes away 
that, in business on the internet, there are beneﬁts to be gained from the skills required 
for managing information and knowledge insofar as those skills (and associated 
systems) can be honed to further reduce costs. In other words, experience effects exist 
in managing knowledge. For example, BT, the telecommunications operator, has been 
able to capitalize on externally-designed web interfaces because of the skills of its own 
software engineers (Bughin et al., 2008). Additionally, Macher and Boerner found that 
experience in knowledge management has a particularly strong effect on performance 
when combined with economies of scope, and they observed that employees’ ability to 
take ideas from one area and apply them in related areas increased with the experience 
that ﬁrms had at working with knowledge. Their results showed that participating in a 
wide array of research projects did not in itself improve knowledge utilization and 
performance (in fact, it had a detrimental effect on performance), but when combined 
with experience, the effect was positive. That means that the ability to tap into the 
knowledge of the people who make up an open-innovation community, and then be 
able to manage it internally, will create barriers that make it difﬁcult for new entrants 
successfully to enter an industry. 
It long has been recognized that large capital requirements and access to lower-cost 
capital create barriers to entry (Bain, 1956). The rationale for that is readily apparent 
and does not need belaboring here. Sufﬁce it to say that regardless of the source of an 
innovation, large capital requirements for the purchase of, say, capital equipment, still 
create a barrier to entry. However, as discussed below, the nature of internet-based 
open innovation means that some of the cost-of-capital barriers are reduced. 
Open innovation takes away some barriers from scale and some barriers from the 
cost of capital. The majority of thinking on economies of scale was developed before 
computers, the internet, and the emergence of open innovation. While that does not 
invalidate the underlying logic of barriers to entry from scale, particularly in terms of 
things like production, it has been recognized that the internet makes markets more 
contestable by, for example, providing equal visibility to all, regardless of size (Goel 
and Hsieh, 2002; also see Porter, 2001). That logic also applies to open innovation 
because, as already noted, all ﬁrms can beneﬁt from no innovation costs, regardless of 
size; i.e. no-cost innovation eliminates the need to amortize innovation costs across 
large production-runs. For example, Threadless, the shirt retailer that gets its designs 
from, and sells to, on-line customers, has expanded to the point of being able to open a 
physical store in Chicago (Bughin et al., 2008). 
From surveys of executives it has been determined that, after cost advantages of 
incumbent ﬁrms, capital requirements are the next most important barrier to entry 
(Karakaya and Stahl, 1989; Karakaya, 2002). Although the effects of the reduction in 
barriers from capital requirements may not be as dramatic as the elimination of 
product-development costs from open innovation, they still have a negative effect on 
monopoly rents. One of the beneﬁts of ﬁrm size is a reduced likelihood of default on 
debt, which means that the access to capital is easier and the costs of borrowing are 
reduced. That conventional view is being changed by the internet and, as already 
noted, open innovation is primarily an internet-based phenomenon. While 
capital-market access remains rooted in the relationship that ﬁnancial institutions 
develop with the client, the internet has reduced those barriers to entry (Kandampully, 
2003). As individuals in open-innovation communities recognize the value of an 
innovation, they can be made aware of the ﬁnancial needs of the organization and may 
then be willing to risk their own money by providing ﬁnancing. They will become 
informal or angel investors and, as Steier and Greenwood (2000) found for open-source 
software (e.g. Apache, Linux) such investors can “represent a signiﬁcant source of 
venture capital.” This leads to: 
P1.	 Whereas monopoly rents from experience-curve effects should remain intact, 
those from economies of scale and capital requirements will be reduced by 
open innovation. Speciﬁcally, rents from barriers to entry will be reduced as 
market contestability increases due to the reduced costs of innovation, and 
from access to non-traditional sources of capital and the consequent reduced 
costs of capital. 
Cost-based advantage and Ricardian rents 
Open innovation allows some rents from employee know-how, culture, and networks. 
Hall’s (1993) study revealed that employee knowhow was rated by managers as one of 
the most “durable” and “important contributors to business success.” It includes the 
tacit skills and knowledge that make imitation difﬁcult. In addition to the usual 
operational and administrative skills that underpin advantage, there also is knowhow 
on the integration of the internet and its tools into the business model – it has changed 
the way ﬁrms communicate with customers, sell their products, and manage their 
supply chain. Similarly, for open innovation, there is a need for know-how in working 
with (and not alienating) individuals in the open-innovation community. Nokia is 
working on a culture change to incorporate the open-innovation process and, where 
Whirlpool uses a more-gradual, stepwise approach to open innovation, IBM threw open 
the internet doors to employees and the public in what it termed an “innovation jam” 
(Collins, 2007)[1]. Clearly, there is no single template for developing the know-how 
necessary for managing open innovation but, once achieved, it becomes a valuable 
resource. 
Hall (1993) reported that the managers in his survey ranked culture as the most 
important resource after employee know-how and product and company reputation. He 
found that the valuable components of culture included the “ability to manage change, 
ability to innovate, team-working ability, participative management style, perception 
of high quality standards, [and] perceptions of high standards of customer service” 
(Hall, 1993, p. 617). Assuming managers’ perceptions of value remain constant, a 
culture that lends itself to embracing and incorporating the change that is occurring 
with the use of open innovation will provide an advantage over ﬁrms where there is 
resistance to such change. Such a change has been implemented at Procter and Gamble 
with their open-innovation program called Connect and Develop. The program has 
moved the culture from one that was insular and shunned products that were not 
developed in-house to one that now incorporates product ideas that were “Proudly 
found elsewhere” (RTM, 2007). Barney (1986) noted that cultures that are valuable, 
rare, and difﬁcult to imitate will confer an advantage. He also noted that many cultures 
are easy to imitate and, thus, are not rare. Given the difﬁculty that many ﬁrms have 
coping with change, particularly overcoming the “not-invented-here syndrome”, we 
can deduce for cultures that value and embrace externally-generated innovations, that 
the former condition of inimitability will hold true rather than the latter. Within the 
context of working with open-innovation communities, that will then become a source 
of cost-based Ricardian rents. 
People in the open-innovation community likely will be willing freely to contribute 
time to innovations where their input is welcomed. Volkswagen draws on ideas from a 
community of Golf GTI enthusiasts and, as work by Fuller et al. (2008) showed, when 
their ideas are welcomed, it has a positive impact on their willingness to be involved in 
open innovation projects. Extending that, it is likely that there are additional beneﬁts 
insofar as the simple act of participating and being able to contribute should help in 
retaining the goodwill of the open-innovation community. Not only should goodwill 
lead to more cooperation in the innovation process, reducing costs even more, but it 
may also mean that more innovations will be forthcoming. In short, if managed well by 
the ﬁrm, there is a “feel-good” effect for members of the open-innovation community 
that is self-reinforcing. Managing the process well means that the skills embodied in 
team-working abilities and participative management are complementary to what is 
happening in the open-innovation community, which, in turn, should lead to more rents 
in the form of even greater difﬁcult-to-imitate efﬁciency. 
Networks – the human relations that transcend the requirements of organization 
and commercial relationships – have become a favorite research topic in management, 
whether they are at the level of the organization or the individual[2]. It is the latter that 
is of relevance here because open innovation means that it is individuals, albeit in a 
community, with whom the ﬁrm has to work. The VP for Innovation at Procter and 
Gamble explained: “When you’re inventing within your own walls and boundaries, you 
have a lot of positional power – command and control is hierarchical. But when you’re 
leveraging people whom you don’t have direct control over, you have to build 
relationships and trust” (RTM, 2007). Those relationships and trust are particularly 
important in the case of open-innovation community leaders. Research has revealed 
that open-innovation community leaders not only have the required technical skills, 
they also have the ability to encourage the volunteers to coalesce behind a common 
goal (Fleming and Waguespack, 2007). Given that both managerial and innovation 
performance are products of managers’ micro-social processes within networks and the 
consequent variety of knowledge to which managers are exposed, we may expect that 
there should be the opportunity for accessing and recombining knowledge held by 
these leaders and elites in the open-innovation community that will help reduce costs of 
both organization and operation[3]. Therefore, the network of contacts and 
relationships with individuals also should constitute a rent-generating resource. 
Databases were a resource that managers in Hall’s (1993) study perceived as being 
important for sustaining competitive advantage. However, even as Hall was 
conducting his research, the use of relational databases (e.g. SQL Server, Oracle, 
DB2) was becoming common-place in business. The next generation of information 
technology, the one that is replacing those legacy databases and also now is starting to 
become prevalent in large organizations, is enterprise-planning software (e.g. SAP, 
PeopleSoft/Oracle). The software contains customized databases that facilitate the 
integration of manufacturing, marketing, accounting, and so forth, to improve 
efﬁciency in the process of creating and delivering goods to customers. As yet, and as 
far as we are aware, no software includes the facility for integrating open innovation 
into the database. Should that ever occur, the software will provide an advantage to 
those organizations that purchase it, but the advantage will be temporary as other 
organizations are able to purchase it and re-level the playing ﬁeld. We thus set aside 
the use of databases as a source of Ricardian rents. 
Open innovation takes away some of the value of employee knowhow on 
ﬁrm-generated innovation. Enkel and colleagues noted that too much openness may 
not be a good thing for the longer-term because it can erode core (innovation) 
competencies (Enkel et al., 2009). Those competencies, which are embedded within 
R&D activities, organizational routines, and organization culture are required for 
capitalizing on innovations procured externally (Veugelers, 1997). The longer-term cost 
manifests itself in lost synergy gains from the interaction with external sources of 
innovation and the consequent spillover that ends up as new innovations that, 
otherwise, would not have been recognized. Research (e.g. Audretsch and Keilbach, 
2007) has shown that situations that are knowledge impoverished generate fewer 
spillover entrepreneurial-opportunities than those that are not. 
Whether or not open innovation will completely replace traditional approaches to 
innovation is difﬁcult to predict but, as open innovation gains strength, and as ﬁrms 
strive to compete with others that have adopted open innovation, the emphasis on 
traditional approaches likely will decline because the open-innovation community 
works for free. Even though some managers, like those at Procter and Gamble, are 
keenly aware of the importance of retaining a strong internal R&D function, managers 
who are under pressure to improve returns in the short-term may reduce spending on 
internal innovation (RTM, 2007). In short, the knowhow associated with these 
conventional approaches to innovation will deteriorate as innovation skills, absorptive 
capacity, and the organizational routines that produce the ability to innovate are 
diminished or lost. For example, Boeing has long realized that when it comes to 
innovation, you “use it or lose it” (Gunter, 2002). That not only means that revenue 
potential is lost but also that the average cost of innovation is higher than it otherwise 
would be. Thus: 
P2.	 Whereas cost-based Ricardian rents from organization culture and networks 
should remain intact, those from employee knowhow will be reduced by open 
innovation. Speciﬁcally, as ﬁrms rely more on open innovation, their ability to 
innovate using traditional internal sources will diminish and the opportunity 
costs of missed chances for innovation synergies and spillovers will increase. 
Differentiation-based advantage and monopoly rents 
Open innovation allows monopoly rents to be extracted from product differentiation 
and customer switching costs. Differentiation arises from several sources and, as 
Karakaya and Stahl (1989, p. 85) state: 
Established ﬁrms have brand identiﬁcation and customer loyalties stemming from past 
advertising, customer service, product differences, or simply being ﬁrst into the market. 
Clearly, the idea of differentiation creating a barrier to entry is heavily inﬂuenced by 
traditional views on marketing but, with open innovation, marketing requirements 
likely will change. Some ﬁrms already have learned that lesson. As already mentioned, 
Volkswagen has tapped into the Golf-GTI community for innovations, and Ducati, 
Harley Davidson, and Nike have capitalized on innovations suggested by their own 
communities (Fuller et al., 2008). At Niketalk community members created new 
features for basketball shoes that they want, and presumably value, which means that 
they are perfectly differentiated. Per conventional wisdom, increased differentiation 
means higher barriers to entry and, thus, increased monopoly rents. 
Amit and Zott (2001, p. 508) explained how, among other things, e-businesses ﬁnd 
“new ways of conducting and aligning commercial transactions . . .  [and] creating 
value by connecting previously unconnected parties, eliminating inefﬁciencies in the 
buying and selling process through adopting innovative transaction methods, 
capturing latent customer needs (such as haggle-free car purchasing from the 
convenience of your home), and/or by creating entirely new markets (e.g., auctions for 
low-ticket items).” As open innovation becomes more widespread and an accepted way 
for companies to do business, open-innovation communities, being driven by 
self-interest, likely will identify even more links, connections, methods of transaction, 
and latent markets to serve even more of their needs (i.e. they will create even more 
opportunities for differentiation). In turn, word-of-mouth recommendations within 
open-innovation communities take on a new importance as online-community 
members proselytize products to others (Fuller et al., 2008). 
Switching costs are the costs incurred when a buyer switches from one supplier’s 
product to another’s. However, even when switching costs exist, it does not mean that 
ﬁrms using open innovation cannot coexist with businesses using traditional 
approaches to innovation. For example, as we have witnessed for open sourcing of 
software, Linux and Microsoft coexist, and we now are witnessing the coexistence of 
goods developed through open innovation by organizations like the Whirlpool with 
more-traditionally developed offerings (Collins, 2007). If the ﬁrm using open innovation 
is ﬁrst to market then the second entrant needs a constant source of new customers or 
existing customers that are willing to switch, which means that the good has to provide 
signiﬁcant beneﬁts above and beyond the cost of switching. If the open-innovation 
product is second to the market, then it faces the same problems. Beyond that no-effect 
scenario, open innovation can lead to increased switching costs because, as Amit and 
Zott (2001) noted, existing views on resource-based theory include the concept of 
complementarity among assets as a source of value creation, and they go on to explain 
how value can be created by bundling complementary products. Because bundling 
provides efﬁciencies for customers, and because people are nothing if not self serving, 
it is likely that open-innovation communities will tend to produce innovations 
incorporating bundles of goods. The bundles and efﬁciencies they desire creates 
increased differentiation which means they also will incur increased switching costs. 
Therefore, barriers competition and new entry, and the consequent rents from 
switching costs should, at a minimum, continue to be available with open innovation. 
Conventional wisdom (e.g. Porter, 1980) also holds that the importance of channels 
of distribution for creating monopoly rents comes from the barriers to new entry that 
arise either when incumbents control channels (e.g. the industry is vertically 
integrated), or when distributors are satisﬁed with the products and services provided 
by established ﬁrms. The underlying rationale was pre-internet and clearly based on 
the distribution of products through resellers. Today, there are competing views on 
what has happened to the beneﬁts of channel control. First, favorable word-of-mouth in 
online communities about the service provided by a distributor allows the distribution 
channel to retain its barrier-to-entry properties (Flavian and Guinaliu, 2005). Second, it 
has been argued that the technology reduces the power of wholesalers and retailers 
insofar as it allows customers to deal directly with suppliers, which eliminates the need 
for “middlemen” (Porter, 2001). Either way, the effect is a reinforcing of the barriers. 
Such is particularly the case with ﬁrms dealing with open-innovation communities. 
Contact with community members is established prior to any sale and, assuming that 
members of the open-innovation community have an interest in purchasing a product 
they have helped develop, that contact allows the ﬁrm sell the product directly. Some 
ﬁrms (e.g. Threadless and Muji) have taken that one step further by getting preorders 
from the innovating communities they work with prior to any production (Bughin 
et al., 2008; Ogawa and Pillar, 2006). 
Open innovation takes away the barriers created by traditional means of protecting 
property rights and from the control of distribution channels. Given that we primarily 
are concerned with the effect on ﬁrms using innovations where the intellectual 
property remains under the control of the open-innovation community, or the 
community makes it free to all, patents and secrecy are not available to the ﬁrm. 
Therefore, in short, no control over the intellectual property effectively eliminates that 
potential for monopoly rents. Therefore: 
P3.	 Whereas monopoly rents from differentiation, distribution-channel control, 
and customer-switching costs should remain intact, those from the possession 
of intellectual property will be reduced by open innovation. Speciﬁcally, as 
ﬁrms rely more on open innovation, rents from barriers to entry from 
proprietary intellectual property will be reduced. 
Differentiation-based advantage and Ricardian rents 
Open innovation allows ﬁrms to continue to beneﬁt from reputation, employee 
knowhow, and organization culture. In Hall’s (1993) survey, managers rated reputation 
as being a major contributor to sustainable advantage. Their judgment is supported by 
an array of research that conﬁrms the existence and validity of the link between 
reputation and ﬁrm performance (e.g. Black et al., 2000; Graham and Bansal, 2007; 
Gregory, 1998). A good reputation is a resource that is valuable and difﬁcult to imitate 
and, although it easily can be damaged, it also can be durable (Carter and Rueﬂi, 2006). 
Thus, ﬁtting with the resource-based view, it is an intangible resource that can be a 
source of Ricardian rents – customers are willing to pay a premium for goods from 
ﬁrms with a superior reputation – and that condition should hold regardless of the 
source of an innovation. Hall (1993, p. 616) stated: 
The emphasis placed on this resource by CEOs suggests that a key task of management is to 
make sure that every employee is disposed to be both a promoter and a custodian of the 
reputation of the organization . . .  
That notion extends to members of the open-innovation community. Clearly, as the 
Senior VP for R&D and the VP for Innovation at Procter and Gamble recognized, 
members of innovation communities are not employees but, because of their 
involvement in the innovation process, there is the potential for an afﬁnity with the 
created product and its producer (RTM, 2007). Those contributing to open-innovation 
projects are likely to take ownership of the product they have helped create, which 
means they likely will recommend it to others (see Wind, 2006, who argued that people 
become advocates for companies and recommend goods and services to others). 
Amit and Zott (2001) identiﬁed a concept of “lock-in” for e-businesses, and it applies 
here. They noted how lock-in arises from resources such as brand name and trust. In 
their research on the Volkswagen community, Fuller et al. (2008) found that brand 
passion led to brand trust which, in turn, led to active participation in open-innovation 
projects. Thus, under conditions of open innovation, ﬁrm brand – and we also include 
reputation – remain a valuable and difﬁcult-to-imitate resource, which means they can 
be a source of Ricardian rents. Amit and Zott (2001, p. 507) also explained that the 
interactions between community members become “network generators” as one 
member of the network has “an effect on the production or utility function of other 
participants in the network. . .  and e-business operations can be designed to harness 
the power of this lock-in mechanism.” In short, branding (and reputation) take on a new 
importance when open innovation is introduced into the process of creating and 
producing goods, and its rent-generating potential should thus remain intact. 
Hall’s (1993) study identiﬁed perceptions of high quality and perceptions of high 
customer service as being important parts of culture that contributed to sustained 
advantage. Within the extensive literature on quality management there are no 
dissenting voices on the importance of top-management commitment to quality, the 
creation of a supportive culture, and the importance of employee education and 
training for being able to deliver quality. Similarly, on customer service, both the 
organization-behavior and marketing literatures have emphasized climate and culture 
as important mechanisms for employee guidance[4]. We already noted that Hall 
reported that managers ranked culture as the most important resource after employee 
knowhow and product and company reputation, and we explained how Procter and 
Gamble has adjusted their culture to better work with open-innovation communities. 
And, coming full circle, there clearly exists a relationship between a culture of quality 
and customer service and branding and reputation. So, in terms of open innovation, we 
can deduce that culture also is a source of rents. 
Open innovation takes away some employee know-how and some beneﬁts of 
organization culture. Employee know-how is valuable not only in terms of improving 
operational efﬁciencies, but also in being the cornerstone of anticipating customer 
needs. Customer intimacy is one of the things that helps ﬁrms to create value for which 
customers are willing to pay. In their study of market leaders, Treacy and Wiersema 
(1995, p. xv) noted that: 
Customer-intimate companies do not pursue one-time transactions; they cultivate 
relationships. They specialize in satisfying unique needs, which often only they, by virtue 
of their close relationship with – and intimate knowledge of – the customer recognize. 
They also explain that intimate knowledge goes beyond developing a relationship with 
the customer to include “breakthrough insights” that permit the identiﬁcation of “total 
solutions” to customers’ needs. While this ability to identify unrealized customer needs 
is rooted in employee knowhow, the desire to identify such needs and to commercialize 
them is driven by organization culture (see Mitsch’s, 1990, discussion of 3M). 
As previously noted, as ﬁrms rely more on open innovation, the ability to innovate 
may well diminish or be lost altogether. Not only will design skills be lost, but 
employees will not acquire the knowledge required to be able to create what customers 
do not know they need, nor will they be driven by the tradition of translating those 
needs into commercial goods. The danger of relying solely on open innovation already 
has been recognized by managers at Proctor and Gamble (RTM, 2007). Thus, ﬁrms’ 
ability to separate themselves consistently from other companies by producing the 
products that spawn new markets will be reduced, as will the availability of Ricardian 
rents: 
P4.	 Whereas differentiation-based Ricardian rents from reputation should remain 
intact, those from employee knowhow and organization culture will be reduced 
by open innovation. Speciﬁcally, as ﬁrms rely more on open innovation, rents 
from the ability to anticipate customer needs will be reduced. 
Discussion 
Openness to new ideas from the environment improves ﬁrms’ innovation performance. 
Laursten and Salter (2006) found that as the breadth and depth of searching using 
external actors and sources increased, so did innovation, and that while too much 
searching led to diseconomies and performance deterioration, openness to new ideas 
from the environment is superior to a closed, in-house, internal focus on innovation. 
Consequently, more and more ﬁrms are ﬁnding value by tapping into the ideas of online, 
open-innovation communities. In this work we have explored what happens to the 
drivers of competitive advantage and consequent economic rents when ﬁrms use 
innovations from communities that are not ﬁrm sponsored and not sponsored by a third 
party. We deduced that open innovation modiﬁes the sources of monopoly rents for 
industry incumbents from barriers to entry: while rents from property rights disappear, 
and those from economies of scale and capital requirements will be reduced, those from 
experience-curve effects, differentiation, distribution, and switching costs will remain. 
Similarly, Ricardian rents from the valuable and difﬁcult-to-imitate resources of 
networks and reputation should remain intact, and while those from employee knowhow 
and culture will remain, they will be in reduced amounts. Some of those monopoly and 
Ricardian rents that remain available may, however, take on the form of the shorter-lived 
quasi rents as things like product differentiation becomes easier to imitate because these 
community-led innovation groups make technology and designs freely available. That 
means that things like ﬁrm reputation become even more important for sustaining rents. 
Synthesizing these conclusions, we can deduce that while many of the fundamentals of 
our existing models of strategy still work in the face of this new source of innovation, the 
way we view and use them will have to be adjusted. That means adjusting, rather than 
abandoning, our dominant paradigm and rethinking some of our research questions. 
There is a tradeoff between the beneﬁts of open innovation and the beneﬁts of 
internally-generated innovation. That raises the question: at what point do the beneﬁts 
of reduced innovation costs from open innovation stop outweighing the increases in 
costs that come from lost scale and synergy effects in innovation, from reduced 
abilities to anticipate customer needs, and from not being able to eliminate or control 
competition by owning the intellectual property that surrounds an innovation? We 
have focused on community-controlled open innovation because it provided a more 
stringent test of the drivers of competitive-advantage, but the other forms of open 
innovation – ﬁrm controlled, third-party controlled – also need to be assessed for their 
impact on competitive advantage. It may be that equiﬁnality exists among the different 
forms when matched with differing ﬁrm innovation skills and cultures, but that needs 
to be conﬁrmed through empirical research. 
There are numerous contingencies that also need to be incorporated as we move 
forward with both theory and empirical testing. For example, here we implicitly held 
constant the type of innovation – radical versus incremental innovation, architectural 
versus component, or competence-enhancing versus competence-destroying 
innovation. We held constant the effects of network externalities and the installed 
base which, in varying degrees, have implications for both monopoly and Ricardian 
rents. Further, having managed to access an open-innovation community, and 
assuming that, as described, there are rents available, the question becomes can the 
ﬁrm appropriate them? Grant (1991) explained how the appropriation of rents can be 
difﬁcult if the resources that created them are vested in the skills of an individual. The 
“elite” members of innovating communities have power and may be able to bargain 
with the ﬁrm for special deals (preferential prices, payments, perquisites) that erode 
rents. In other words, they may behave like powerful employees and appropriate rents. 
If the ﬁrm does not provide what are deemed to be adequate discounts or perquisites, 
and because the organization has no control over them, they can stop cooperating and 
encourage less elite members of the community to do the same. This scenario ﬁts 
closely with Amit and Zott’s (2001) observation that peer recommendations have a 
downside because they can turn into a “dangerous downward spiral”. 
In terms of the implications for practice, we can deduce that ﬁrms whose competitive 
advantage is driven by experience-curve effects and employee knowhow in operations 
can capitalize on the beneﬁts of open innovation with little risk of losing advantage. 
Similarly, the risk is limited for those whose advantage comes from differentiation, 
distribution-channel control, switching costs, and reputation. However, ﬁrms whose 
competitive advantage is driven by barriers to industry entry, existing innovation 
abilities that drive synergies in capitalizing on external innovation and in spillovers, that 
depend on their innovation skills for anticipating their customers’ needs, or that rely on 
proprietary product-designs, risk losing advantage by using open innovation. 
Clearly, there are risks associated with the use of open innovation. However, not 
using open innovation may be even riskier. Although research on the phenomenon of 
open innovation continues to gather momentum, there is much that is yet to be done. In 
this work we have provided insight into the effects on the drivers of competitive 
advantage. The next stage is to take this thinking on content and to interpret it into 
models of process that can be translated into normative recipes to guide ﬁrms in the 
quest to capitalize on the open-innovation phenomenon. 
Notes 
1. Collins (2007) also linked Whirlpool’s use of open innovation with its return to proﬁt growth. 
2. This deﬁnition of networks is from Hall (1993). As noted, research on networks is extensive. 
Examples of research at the level of organization includes work by Echols and Tsai (2005); 
Schilling and Phelps (2007); Tsai (2001). At the level of the individual it includes work by 
Nooteboom (2000); Rodan and Galunic (2004). 
3. This argument is based on the ﬁndings of Rodan and Galunic (2004). 
4. This observation on the commonality between the literatures was made by Bowen (1990). 
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